South American Summit Resolutions Put to the Test

 
One month after the Summit of South American Presidents, with the controversial comments of Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez and the debate over the Plan Colombia out of the picture, the real impact of the deliberations has become clear in three main areas.

First, the Summit seems to have provided Brazil with the "coming out party" that it sought, reinvigorating efforts to show its autonomy and rejection of US economic and trade policies for the region. As several commentators have noted, Brazil's leadership comes at the expense of Mexico's. President Fernando Henrique Cardoso has been careful to avoid alienating his Mexican counterpart, President Elect Vicente Fox.

Second, it appears that the summit process has revived Chile's political, if not economic, will to become a full partner in MERCOSUR. This question is moving forward with surprising speed. September 22 marked the completion of a first round of meetings to develop a chronology and methodology for the full participation of Chile in MERCOSUR. The goal is to complete the formal proposal for incorporation before the next meeting of MERCOSUR presidents, on December 15, 2000 (although the actual negotiations are not expected to be concluded before the end of 2001). Chile currently has an external tariff of 9%, compared to a MERCOSUR external tariff of close to14%. To raise tariffs in Chile is out of the question, for the Chilean Congress has already mandated that the government lower the rates even further, to 6% by 2003. Thus, Chile's transition to full membership will have to be gradual and will involve bringing MERCOSUR's tariff structure slowly into line with Chile's. Considering the tensions between Brazil and Argentina over tariff issues, this would seem to be a daunting task. Chilean Foreign Ministry spokesmen claim that ascension to MERCOSUR is President Ricardo Lagos's top foreign policy objective, but it might be more of a negotiating ploy as Chile waits for fast track approval in the US Congress in 2001 (a scenario that seems increasingly likely, no matter who wins the US presidential elections).

Third, the "democracy clause" approved in the final Summit declaration may receive its first test in Peru and the transition to new elections in that country. In an article for infobrazil.com, noted Brazilianist Riorden Roett points out that "the leaders must now undertake the difficult task of making operational their commitment to representative democracy as the foundation of the legitimacy of political systems, and an indispensable condition for the region's peace, stability and development. If the Brasília encounter is to be taken seriously," he continues, "there must be a commitment to deepening the democratic process across the continent." Roett concludes that it would be a mistake to believe that each country is a free agent in the process of consolidating democracy. This question is sure to be tested in the next days and weeks, not only in Peru but also perhaps in Paraguay and Ecuador.

To meet this challenge, the mature democracies of South America and Mexico will have to do more than hold consultations. It will be interesting to see how they follow through when they are confronted with tough decisions on their borders. The fact that Peruvian President Alberto Fujimori, coping with the political crisis in his country, flew to Washington and not Brasília on September 28 is indicative of the confidence he has in the interest and consistency of the Brasília's Declaration's commitment to democracy. Brazil welcomed Fujimori to the South American Summit and resisted US attempts to intervene in the election process. Fujimori's trip to Washington was therefore a blow to Brazil's political stance as the leader in the region..

At the moment, critics consider that most of the gains Brazil achieved from its autonomous stance at the South American Summit come at the expense of Central America and the Caribbean. As Brazil continues to reject US pressures for the FTAA, it appears insensitive to the needs of the smaller economies of these regions. Brazilian Foreign Minister Luiz Felipe Lampreia has not hesitated in stating that "Brazil has the size and can't hide it." Smaller nations have expressed concern that Brazil will attempt to replace the US as the dominant factor in their local markets. In addition, ecologists and development experts fear that the Brasília Declaration's emphasis on regionalismo abierto ("open regionalism")-a term popularized by ECLAC in the early 1990s-places priority on the liberalization of commercial flows over social and environmental concerns. Feeding these fears, the coordinator of economic integration affairs for Brazil's Foreign Office, Ambassador José Alfredo Graça Lima, was quoted in the Estado de São Paulo on September 20 as advising US presidential envoy Buddy McKay that "the inclusion of a labor or environmental clause has nothing to do with the negotiations for a free trade area."

These comments are emblematic of the concerns of environmentalists, trade union leaders and other elements of civil society that most governments believe trade somehow should be isolated from the process of more equitable social development. These concerns will continue to be debated as preparations continue for the April 2001 Summit of the Americas in Quebec City.