Rand Corporation Warns of Collapse of Colombian State
          
by Jorge Pulecio

  
Version en español

Colombia's political and institutional instability has many manifestations, among them the rise of international drug trafficking and the growing threat to the stability of neighboring countries. As a result, Colombia has become the ultimate test of hemispheric security, including the security of the United States itself. At stake in the conflict, argues a June 2001 report by the Rand Corporation, is not only the success of the war against drugs, but the viability and survival of the Colombian state.

"Colombian Labyrinth: The Synergy of Drugs and Insurgency and Its Implications for Regional Stability," has twofold importance: Besides supplying an insightful discussion of the nature and extent of the Colombian crisis, it recommends a shift in US policy toward Colombia. Its most important conclusion is the assertion that the profound weakness of the state and its institutions, in particular the armed forces, is at the heart of Colombia's problems. This weakness has made it impossible for the central government to exert full control over the national territory.

Colombia has a long history of a weak state presence in the more remote regions of the country. More recently, the crisis of legitimacy of President Ernesto Samper (1994-1998), who was alleged to have accepted money from drug traffickers to finance his campaign, and the US decision to decertify his administration in the war on drugs had a profound effect on Colombia's image abroad. Adding to these pressures in the mid-1990s was the worst economic recession in recent Colombian history. The fall of world petroleum prices, trouble in the construction industry and decertification were all factors contributing to Colombia's economic woes. Along with the increased flow of narcotics financing to guerrilla and paramilitary groups, they helped bring about the current climate of social, political and institutional instability in Colombia.

In 1998, President Andrés Pastrana began to improve Colombia's public image and relations with the United States. To date, however, Pastrana's strategy of negotiating with the guerrillas has been unsuccessful. During his administration, the guerrillas have become even stronger, thanks to their profits from drug trafficking.

As a result, the Rand report argues, Plan Colombia-funded with a $1.3 billion aid package from the US in 1999-2001-is mistaken in its focus. It emphasizes military operations against the traffic in narcotics and, to a lesser degree, compensation for the social cost of the war on drugs in rural communities. Plan Colombia is based on the assumption that curtailing the drug trade will dry up the guerrillas' financing, weakening their forces to the point that they will accept serious peace talks. Both parties benefit under this optimistic scenario: Colombia will be at peace at last, and less illegal drugs will make their way into the US market.

What the architects of this plan didn't take into account, the Rand Corporation notes, is that at this stage of the conflict the guerrillas pose a threat to the Colombian state itself. In fact, Colombia already meets the definition of "failed state," characterized by "a severe political crisis in which the institutions of the central government are so weakened that they can no longer maintain authority or political order beyond the major cities, and sometimes not even there."

The Colombian state is in real danger of imminent collapse, the report continues, with other forces moving in to fill the void left in different regions or at the national level. The authors go on to present several possible scenarios for the future of the Colombian crisis and its consequences for the strategic interests of the United States.

Scenario #1. Successful Peace Agreement.
A peace accord would most likely be based on one of the following examples: a) the Central American model, in which former guerrilla fighters are incorporated into the political process with free elections. As was the case in El Salvador, Colombia's guerrillas would demobilize and international observers would verify that the terms of the peace agreement were kept. The armed forces would be restructured and assigned to national defense instead of internal peacekeeping. The police forces would also undergo a process of restructuring. The second phase of the process would involve the consolidation of democratic norms, practices and institutions. A Truth Commission and Ombudsman would oversee human rights. This is the preferred scenario of the Pastrana government and of most Colombians, but so far no real progress has been made toward achieving it. b) A variation on the Central American model, including a cease fire and partial demobilization of the guerrilla forces to allow them to retain control of the areas they dominate. Selected zones around the control would remain under guerrilla control. Colombia is probably moving in this direction, toward the partition of the country, but any such outcome would require the acquiescence of the paramilitary units.

Scenario #2: Turning the Tide
In this scenario the government decides to take the political and military initiative. A first step is eliminating the demilitarized zones, where the peace talks between the government and the FARC are held, and which strategically benefit the guerrillas. This scenario assumes that the army is capable of defeating the insurgents and establishing effective control over the national territory. This would force the guerrillas to begin negotiating, as occurred in El Salvador and Guatemala. However, the Rand study warns of a possible escalation in the fighting if the guerrillas believe they are losing the ability to influence the conflict's outcome. They may take the war to the major cities, including Bogotá, in a strategy similar to the Vietnamese Tet Offensive. Alternatively, they may focus their attacks on the US-trained antinarcotics battalions.

Scenario #3: Stalemate
Many observers consider it more likely that the guerrillas will win a decisive military victory over government forces. But a military stalemate does not mean stability; instead, a change in the balance of power could take place over the medium or long term, resulting in the collapse of one or another of the combatants (consider, for example, China in 1949, Cuba in 1959, or Nicaragua in 1979).

Scenario #4: The Peruvian Model
The Colombian government could attempt to follow the example of former Peruvian President Alberto Fujimori, breaking off the peace negotiations and unleashing the force of the army and other security forces against the guerrillas. This model implies human rights violations and neglect of legal norms, such as trying suspected guerrillas in secret military courts. The US and Europe will not support the Colombian government if it adopts this course of action, but it becomes ever more likely as popular support wanes for the current stalled peace process. The offensive could be led by civilian officials with military backing, as was the case in Peru, or by the military with civilian support, as already occurred in Colombia under Rojas Pinilla in 1953.

Scenario #5: Disintegration
If the conflict becomes an all-out war between guerrillas and paramilitaries, the government would be unable to control the violence. The fighting would spread to major cities and local governments would be coopted by the opposing groups, a process which has already begun. Several local strongholds could emerge around the country, as was the case in Mexico after the 1910 revolution.

Scenario #6: FARC Takeover or Power-Sharing
The continued deterioration of the situation could result in a FARC victory or a peace accord on FARC terms. The guerrillas would likely establish a Cuban-style state characterized by nationalization of the economy and an "anti-imperialist" foreign policy. A middle-class exodus would surely follow. A variation on this scenario would be some type of arrangement between the government and the FARC, enabling the guerrillas to keep control over the country's coca-producing areas. The US would never accept this outcome.

Scenario #7: Internationalization of the Conflict
As occurred in the Dominican Republic in 1964, neighboring countries could decide to intervene under the umbrella of the OAS to restore the Colombian government. The FARC and other radical groups could be expected to respond with attacks against such strategic targets as the Panama Canal. In the worst case, the FARC could ally itself with the government of Venezuela. Ecuador and Peru could also be destabilized by these events.

The Most Likely Outcome
Most analysts will agree with the Rand report's conclusion that "the deterioration of the Colombian government's position has not reached an irreversible stage." The study characterizes the present situation as "a stalemate, with all sides preparing for an intensified level of violence. The catalyst is expected to be the government's implementation of the 'Drive to the South' anticipated in Plan Colombia."

According to the Rand Corporation, "US aid to the Colombian government and armed forces to develop effective strategies and the capacity to implement them constitutes an important factor that will affect the short-term destiny of Colombia." The authors argue that this factor, along with Bogotá's willingness to consider new political-military policies, will determine which of the above scenarios will prevail.

The report recommends that the US abandon the attempt to differentiate between aid to combat drug trafficking and aid to combat the rebels. US assistance should be defined simply as "the provision of aid to strengthen Colombia's conventional military capacity," the report proposes. "US efforts are focused on strengthening Colombian antinarcotics capabilities while insisting that US military assistance is not directed against the guerrillas. This is unrealistic, given the Colombian government's inability to eradicate the drug trade where it does not have physical control and the magnitude of the political and military threat it faces from the guerrillas and paramilitaries."

The Rand Corporation's report on Colombia is certain to cause widespread debate. It proposes some real options for shifting the orientation of the fighting and the peace talks, with broader consequences for hemispheric security.

For the full text of the Rand report, see www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1339