Colombia Under Limited State of Emergency

   
As Alvaro Uribe Vélez was being sworn in as president of Colombia on August 7, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) launched several attacks in Bogotá. The toll of this latest attempt to "strike back at the oligarchy": 21 dead and 65 wounded. Consistent with his campaign promise to use a "strong hand" against the guerrillas, Uribe declared a limited state of emergency in the country.

As outlined in Article 213 of the Colombian Constitution, the president can take this step in exceptional circumstances that involve serious threats to institutional stability, the state, public order and security that go beyond the scope and capabilities of normal police authority. By declaring a limited state of emergency, the president gains the power to pass decrees that have the force of law and automatically suspend any existing protections that are incompatible with their terms.

The constitution allows a limited state of emergency to be imposed for up to 90 days, with two extensions of 90 days each. Furthermore, all decrees passed by the government during a limited state of emergency are valid only during that period, with a possible extension of 90 days once it is lifted. Under the law, the government may limit certain basic rights, for example, by restricting the free movement and residence of persons; temporarily confiscating property or demanding professional technical services; limiting the media's publication of vital information; and curtailing freedom of association.

This is the sixth time that a Colombian president has declared a limited state of emergency since the new constitution took effect in 1991. Colombia's Constitutional Court ruled in favor of three of the previous declarations and against two of them.

Uribe points to the August 7 attacks and the general increase in attacks by armed groups as justification for declaring the current state of emergency. His administration argues that it lacks the resources and means to stem the mounting crisis in the country. In a press conference, government officials stated their goal to be "a speedy break up of the terrorist groups that are affecting the nation."

According to Fernando Londoño, the minister of the interior and justice, "Colombian society and the state should seek a course to restore national security, as violent actors become ever more aggressive and destructive."

Public opinion largely supports the government's decision. Even the emerging leader of Colombia's leftist movement, Lucho Garzón, stated that "the FARC's actions justify the hardening of the state's position." Carlos Gaviria, a long-time critic of "exceptional" measures, also lent Uribe his support this time.

Political analyst Rodrigo Pardo argues that, "for Uribe, declaring a limited state of emergency only four days after his inauguration sends a message about his intent to respond to the expectations of voters-97% of whom voted for him, according to the Napoleón Franco poll-who elected him as an antidote to violence, a recipe for improved security, and a 'strong hand' against the guerrillas."

"The bloody greeting sent to Uribe by the FARC and his decision to travel to the war-torn César region the next day to launch his civilian watch group campaign are clear signs of the coming war in the next four years," says El Heraldo reporter Gerardo Reyes. "It will pit a president who is a historical enemy of the guerrillas-much more so than any of his predecessors in the last 40 years-against a force determined to belittle him." Jaime Jaramillo Panesso, an expert on Colombian politics, attributes the government's imposition of emergency powers to the August 7 attacks, which he calls "an unjust act of aggression against the power of the state." He sees the president's position as "more of a defensive stance than a declaration of war." But other observers view the decision as an indication that, for the time being, the balance between peace and war will lean more toward the side of open confrontation.

Certainly, the declaration allows the president to gather resources for strengthening the armed forces. Among his plans are creating two new mobile army brigades, establishing a civilian support network for the military and police, and increasing the Armed Forces' budget. In fact, political scientist León Valencia believes that financial motives were the main reason behind the decision. It would take months for these plans to go through normal legislative channels, and, as he points out, the government "urgently needs" funds.

As an editorial in El Tiempo put it, "the FARC may be trying to undermine the state's legitimacy and polarize the conflict, but in fact its actions are giving the government more legitimacy than ever. The guerrillas themselves are becoming a tiny minority in a country almost entirely polarized against them."